autonomous judiciaries (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008) . In general, it is thought that such institutions provide information that is used by dictators to prolong their tenure.
It seems that, on paper, dictatorship looks remarkably similar to democracy, at least that is the presumption in much of the scholarly literature (for an exception, see Brown 2002) . Still, a casual inspection of authoritarian constitutions reveals some very apparent and very important differences. For instance, the Soviet Constitutions left little doubt that the communist party was the "leading and guiding force of Soviet society" (1977 constitution; Brown 2002: 6) . The preamble of North Korea's constitution declares Kim Il-Sung's genius, a reflection of the personality cult of politics in that country. Coup-makers routinely adopt interim constitutions that explicitly suspend the regular operations of government institutions and instead agglomerate power to a junta or revolutionary council. Each of these examples suggests a concentration of (executive) power, a key indicator of authoritarian rule. Is this a general feature of constitutions written by dictators or a stereotype based on a few well-known examples (e.g. the Soviet Union and North Korea)? One cannot answer this question without a systematic, cross-national investigation of the content of authoritarian constitutions.
This inquiry is relevant not only to our understanding of the regime practices of authoritarianism and of institutional convergence, but also to our understanding of the conditions under which formal constitutions correspond with reality. The Soviet joke above highlights the common assumption that law only "matters" if it matches reality. However, this assumption is too simplistic. Most would probably describe the constitutions of North Korea or the USSR as façades or "window dressing" because each guaranteed the protection of human rights that were later repressed by public officials. However, as those examples illustrate, even facade constitutions can give some clues as to actual political practice. Take the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, for instance, the rights guaranteed in that constitution were oppressed, often brutally, but the institutional provisions-the "operating manual"--were taken seriously in some moments (Getty 1991) . In short, it is readily apparent that some parts of authoritarian constitutions match reality while others are meaningless. Understanding where differences between authoritarian and democratic constitutions exist can give some indication about which sections are likely to match practice and which do not.
In this chapter we examine the formal characteristics of constitutions and use the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) database to engage some basic comparisons of authoritarian and democratic constitutions. The CCP records data on over 600 different features of constitutions, including government structure, rights and form. If the Soviet joke is correct, we should see no systematic differences between constitutions in authoritarian and democratic regimes. Alternatively, we might find that there are systematic differences across regime type, controlling for other factors that are determinative of the contents of constitutional text, such as region, era and colonial heritage (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009) . One way to summarize these inituitions is as follows: if all provisions in constitutions were operating manuals, we would expect that democratic and auhtoritarian constitutions would diverge. If all provisions were window dressing, we might expect convergence. Oddly, if we find that constitutional texts are similar across regime type, it implies that the practices of constitution-making may be playing very different functions. The same terms may be genuine promises in democracies, and mere obfuscation or window dressing in the authoritarian context. `This chapter is organized as follows. We first develop the concept of the authoritarian constitution. We then provide our theory, which is that authoritarian constitutions will differ from democratic ones with regard to institutional structures, but not necessarily with regard to rights provisions. Our expectation is of selective or partial convergence. We next examine the empirical evidence, finding that there are very few statistically significant differences between authoritarian and democratic constitutions when controlling for other factors. In addition, the magnitude of the observed differences is small: an authoritarian constitution will have only marginally fewer rights, specificity, or judicial independence, than will a democratic constitution. We find, somewhat surprisingly that there is less formal executive power in authoritarian constitutions. Moreover, we find evidence that authoritarian constitutions tend to converge towards democratic constitutions over time. We speculate that this indicates a continual process of lagged adaptation by authoritarians, who seek to model their texts on those of their democratic counterparts. Democrats innovate in the formal constitution, while dictators tend to imitate formal democratic institutions, saving their innovations for the informal realm. Our findings provide evidence that regime type is a relatively minor determinant of the form of constitutions, relative to region, era and the constitutional legacy of the country.
I.
What is an "Authoritarian" Constitution?
The concept of an authoritarian constitution is not self-defining. To begin, it should be obvious by now -though it is worth emphasizing -that we do not classify authoritarian constitutions as such based on what they say; on the contrary, understanding what they say is our very goal. Rather, we mean the term to refer to constitutions drafted by dictators, but even then, a number conceptual challenges lurk beyond that seemingly straightforward idea. One important challenge is that of timing, inasmuch as the characterization of drafters during a constitutional moment may not be representative of their true colors. Rather than a snapshot, we might look for a pattern of behavior over time in order to distinguish a consolidated dictatorship from a episodes of authoritarian behavior (i.e., an authoritarian "situation" (O'Donnell et al. 1986) To fix ideas, we treat regime type as a binary concept and measure it using the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS) (Pemstein et al. 2010) . 4 Conceptualizing democracy as binary allows us to demarcate clearly the periods of authoritarian rule and regime transition and facilitates a simple operational definition of an authoritarian constitution: an authoritarian [democratic] constitution is one that was promulgated in a year in which its country was coded as authoritarian [democratic] .
Each constitutional system is examined in the year it was adopted, ignoring subsequent amendments to, and shifting interpretations of, the system. 5 Focusing on the inaugural draft, of course, ignores the fluid nature of constitutional systems, which often grow by accretion and could be argued to be written and rewritten constantly. Still, a focus on the constitutional system's inaugural draft ensures that we match the writing with its authors. Admittedly, even inaugural drafts will contain many ideas not conceived by the authors (constitutions are heavily borrowed instruments, after all). Still, an inaugural draft is arguably the document most associated with the actors in power, who, at a minimum, have the ability to pick and choose what they borrow from other constitutions.
An alternative conceptualization of "the constitution" might entail some sort of country-year analysis, in which one would connect the constitution in force with the regime type, in any given year. In that sense, the Mexican constitution would have been an authoritarian one in 1993, but a democratic one in 1995. This sort of approach is too fluid; it assumes that leaders reevaluate their constitution regularly and ignores the costs associated with constitutional change (see Elkins et al. 2009 ). Constitutions are quite sticky (i.e. they exhibit a high degree of serial correlation), so evaluating the initial version makes sense with respect to the analytical issues associated with time dependence. Otherwise, long-lived constitutional systems would flood the analysis with observations dependent on one another.
Defining a constitution as we do, we find that a vast majority of them since 1789 could be considered authoritarian: a whopping 695 of the 846 constitutional systems for which we have data on regime type.. 6 Not surprisingly, the share of constitutions "born democratic" at any given time has increased with the rise of democracy itself over this period (see Figure 1) "authoritarians" are apparently the garden-variety constitution.
On its face, there is something profoundly alarming about this balance. In part, the skewed distribution may stem from a preponderance of authoritarian regime-years in the sample (that is, in statistical terms, an issue of increased exposure). Today, less than half of the world's countries are considered authoritarian, but for most of the modern constitutional era, authoritarian regimes were the norm. Before the third-wave of democracy, roughly 80% of countries were considered authoritarian, and throughout much of the nineteenth century, when the first modern constitutions were written, more than 90% of independent countries were considered authoritarian.
However, the prevalence of authoritarian regimes over the last 225 years is only part of the story. The large number of authoritarian constitutions also reflects differences in fertility across regime types. Authoritarians tend to exhibit a stronger appetite for constitutional replacement than do democrats. Indeed, authoritarians are not only more likely to re-write a democratic constitution but they are also more likely to rewrite their own -that is one drafted by themselves or another authoritarian leader. A democratic constitution has a 0.14 probability of being replaced by an authoritarian leader in any given country-year, compared to a 0.05 probability that a democratic leader will replace an authoritarian constitution. Looking within regimes, authoritarian leaders replace authoritarian constitutions with a probability of 0.05, while the probability that a democratic leader will replace a democratically-written constitution is only 0.01.
The probabilities in the previous paragraph corroborate earlier work on the repudiation or what we might think of as the "intolerable" authoritarian documents -that is those that were born authoritarian and did not survive the transition to democracy (i.e., they were repudiated by the new democrats). The smaller light gray area below "intolerable" authoritarian constitutions represents those constitutions that were written by authoritarian leaders but survived a transition to democracy at some point in their life span. Although this smaller group makes up only 10% of historical constitution, nearly 20% of constitutions in force today are of this variety.
These data contain many potentially interesting digressions, but let us recap and refocus.
We discover that a large percentage of historical constitutions are, by the measure above, authoritarian. One analytic implication of this large population is that it may be worth analyzing and describing subtypes. In particular, in an effort to maximize differences between democratic and authoritarian constitutions, it may be useful to isolate (and study) "hardline" authoritarian constitutions. We can define this category as containing constitutions that were born authoritarian and either subsequently replaced by democrats who assume control after a regime transition or are still in force today. Such constitutions are, arguably, more obviously the work of authoritarians, if the behavior of democrats is any guide.
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II.
Theory: Why (and how) might authoritarian constitutions be different?
Scholars and practitioners alike have come to associate constitutions with democracy. For these individuals, the idea of an authoritarian constitution may sound farcical. However, as we describe shortly, some of the basic objectives of constitution-making do not vary appreciably across regime type. Most writing on constitutions ascribes a relatively small number of functions to them. A central one is precommitment: "becoming committed, bound or obligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on future action . . . to influence someone else's choices." (Schelling 2006: 1) . While authoritarians, at least those with long time horizons, may have less need for formal precommitment devices than would democrats who are certain to be replaced (at least by other democrats) at some point, they still need to make credible promises to their supporters, and constitutions might be one mechanism for doing so.
Written constitutions are also symbolically costly and, as a result, can serve as signals of the actual intentions of the rulers. Beyond their role in establishing institutions, constitutions are "billboards" that can emit communicative signals of government policy (Yu 2010). They play this function because they are politically encumbering. Constitutions are typically, though not always, more entrenched than ordinary law, which means they are also more costly to change.
Even if not manifestly entrenched (due to capricious decision-making by authoritarians), constitutions are "hallowed vessels" and adorned with political and ceremonial weight. Drafting a constitution consumes significant political energy on the part of the governing elite, and provides a repository of regime rhetoric. The costly nature of constitution-making supports the idea that a constitution can be a credible signal of political intentions, even for autocrats.
Another purpose of constitutions in authoritarian regimes is to serve as a simple coordination device among the elites within the regime (Barros 2002) . In any political system, the relevant subjects of the constitution need to coordinate among themselves about the prerogatives and limits of power. The subjects may have strong shared intuitions about these matters, but they may not have inter-subjective agreement on the precise definitions of what counts as an abuse or on procedures for identifying and punishing violations. A written constitution can provide a focal point to generate this inter-subjective understanding (Carey 2000; Hardin 1989; Ordeshook 1992; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997) . Inter-subjective understanding is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the enforcement of constitutional terms.
These functions of precommitment, signaling, and coordination suggest where we might observe differences in formal constitutions across regime type. Consider first the distinction between, on the one hand, constitutional rules that describe and empower institutions, and on the other, rights provisions and limitations on government. Some autocracies might adopt rights as "cheap talk" but on balance, we should expect that autocracies will be less willing to adopt formal limitations on government power, such as judicial checks. However, even autocracies need established rules to coordinate the ruling elite. We thus might expect that there will be a greater congruence between text and practice in the authoritarian setting with regard to governmental institutions. This might lead us to expect that authoritarian regimes would have more executive power, and less judicial power, than democracies. We also might expect less formal power of the legislature, which is generally associated with democratic rule.
The intuition is consistent with the idea that constitutions matter in terms of setting up institutions that will then be able to act in their own defense, but constitutions cannot serve to protect rights any more than the "people themselves" demand. A related argument is that the text matters by initiating basic institutions and reducing decision costs for choices that do not matter very much (Strauss 2003 For many, civil and political rights constitute a central dimension of the concept of democracy. Certainly, some scholars adopt a narrower, procedural definition that excludes rights, but even these scholars will likely admit to a strong elective affinity between rights and democracy, if not a definitional one. We therefore expect authoritarian constitutions -almost by definition -to include fewer rights. Although we are mindful of the conditional hypothesis that it is precisely this area of the constitution (rights) in which authoritarians are likely to misrepresent themselves, we believe the expected probability that constitutional rights will be enforced at some future point in is greater than zero, regardless of regime-type. As a result, even authoritarian regimes face an expected cost from the entrenching rights in their constitutions and will do so only sparingly and when there is an expected benefit (e.g. signaling a commitment to human rights to international audiences).
Consider another variable: constitutional specificity (Elkins et al. 2009 ). We use this concept to capture the breadth and depth of constitutional language; we refer to these as scope and detail, respectively. We assume that specifying details in the constitution is costly, and so is only undertaken in response to real needs of some kind. One of the major determinants of constitutional specificity is audience heterogeneity (Ginsburg 2010) . If all subjects of the constitution share a set of baseline and unwritten understandings about politics, there is less need to articulate details in the formal text. On the other hand, when audiences are heterogeneous, we should expect that there will be a greater need for formal mechanisms of coordination. Ceteris paribus, democratic constitutions have more heterogeneous audiences than do autocratic constitutions: the winning coalition is larger, and less bound by shared ideological or normative commitments. One would thus expect that there would be higher levels of constitutional specificity in democratic constitutions.
To summarize, we expect authoritarian constitutions to be less specific, protect fewer rights,,
give the executive more power and the legislature less power, and provide for less judicial independence. Since we expect that the fit between text and practice will be tighter in the institutional arena as opposed to the rights arena, we expect that any differences between regimes in the latter category will be more muted.
III.

Operationalizing Constitutional Attributes
We operationalize many of concepts discussed above using indices developed by the principal investigators of the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP). For instance, to measure executive power, we use a measure developed by Elkins et al. (2011) . In that paper, we create an additive index that captures how many of the following powers are granted to the executive:
initiate legislation, issue decrees, declare states of emergency, propose amendments to the constitution, veto legislation, challenge the constitutionality of legislation, and dissolve the legislature. 9 In addition, we use a measure of judicial independence created by Ginsburg and Melton (2013). The measure is additive and captures the number of aspects of the constitution that are generally thought to enhance the autonomy of the judiciary: an explicit declaration of independence, selection and removal procedures that involve multiple bodies, whether or not the conditions upon which judges can be removed from office are explicitly mentioned, life tenure for judges, and protection of judges salaries. Lastly, we use two measure of specificity developed in Elkins et al. (2009) . The first measure is scope, which is the percent of topics addressed in the constitution out of a set of 58 key topics from the CCP's survey instrument; the second measure is detail, which is the number of scope topics addressed in the constitution divided by the length (in words) of the constitution.
In addition to the measures created by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, we create two new measures of constitutional rights. The CCP's survey instrument asks about the presence of 116 constitutional rights. Recall that we expect dictators to only adopt rights when there is some benefit from doing so. One such benefit is to signal their commitment to international human rights norms. Thus, we suspect that authoritarian leaders can signal this commitment by adopting rights that are commonly agreed upon by the international community. As a result, they are more likely to incorporate rights commonly found in other countries' constitutions and are less likely to incorporate rights found only rarely in other countries' constitutions. To test this hypothesis, we need measures of "common" rights and "rare" rights. We consider a right "common" if it is incorporated into half or more of the constitutions in force at the time a constitution is drafted. We consider a right "rare" if it is incorporated into less than half of the constitution in force at the time a constitution is drafted. We then measure the percentage of common and rare rights incorporated each constitution. Notably, the number of common and rare rights (the denominator when calculating this percentage) depends on when the constitution is promulgated. period, and constitutional history).
IV.
Regression Models
We assess the validity of the hypotheses above by regressing the six de jure indices listed in We use two measures of regime type, both of which were discussed above. Our primary measure is binary and coded one if the country is coded as authoritarian in the year the constitution was promulgated. The secondary measure captures differences between authoritarian constitutions that experience a transition to democracy and those that do not. We include two binary variables to capture the difference between these two types of authoritarian constitutions. For all of the models estimated below, the reference category for the authoritarian constitution variable(s) is constitutions promulgated in democratic country-years.
We include several variables to control for factors that we generally associated with the contents of constitutions. Region is associated with a number of variables that one might suspect affects the contents of constitutions (e.g. colonial heritage, legal origin, religion, etc.). We include a series of binary variables for different regions (Latin America is the reference category)
to help control for all of these factors, while saving as many degrees of freedom as possible.
Countries' constitutional histories also have a strong influence on the content of their present constitution. Constitutional provisions tend to favor some individuals' interests over others, so once an attribute is entrenched, it often exhibits a high degree of path dependence, as those who are benefited by a provision fight for its continued inclusion. To control for this path dependence, we include the value of the dependent variable from the countries' previous constitution as an independent variable. 10 Yet another factor associated with a constitution's contents is the time period in which it is written. Certain constitutional provisions are fashionable in some time periods and not others. Take constitutional rights, for instance. We already noted that many more rights are included in constitutions today than what were included in constitutions 200 years ago. To control for period effects, we include year fixed-effects in many of the estimates reported below. Lastly, we include country random-effects and robust standard errors clustered on country to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries in the constitutional attributes.
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Tables 2-5 below report the results of the regression models. In general, we estimate three models for each constitutional attribute. The first reports the results when only a binary variable for authoritarian constitutions is included in the model, the second adds covariates to the model, and the third breaks authoritarian constitutions into those that experience a transition and those that do not. The next four sections describe the results of these models for the different constitutional attributes. Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient estimate in model 1 is negative, which suggests that dictators might provide themselves slightly less constitutional power (on average) than democratic leaders. However, this effect is small and not robust. When covariates are included in models 2 and 3, authoritarian constitutions are expected to include more executive power than democratic constitutions, but this effect is not statistically significant. Thus, there is little evidence that executive power varies much between constitutions written by dictators and those written by democrats. Factors like the level of executive power in a country's past constitutions, region, and period are far better predictors of executive power than regime type. Table 3 assesses how the autonomy of the judiciary is affected by a constitution's regime type. Judiciaries are granted far less autonomy in authoritarian constitutions than in democratic constitutions. This effect is consistent across models 4 and 5. Model 6 suggests that this effect is only present in constitutions that never experience a transition to democracy. Authoritarian constitutions that never experience a transition to democracy score -0.17 less than democratic constitutions on the measure of judicial independence used here. In other words, hardline dictators include (on average) one fewer protection of judicial autonomy than democrats in their constitutions. This leaves hardline dictators a gap in the judiciary's protection that, if necessary, they can exploit to curtail its independence (Ginsburg and Melton 2013). Table 4 assesses the effect of authoritarian constitutions on constitutional rights. The dependent variable in models 7, 8, and 9 is the proportion of common rights in the constitution, and the dependent variable in models 10, 11, and 12 is the proportion of rare rights in the constitution. There is an interesting asymmetry between common rights and rare rights. The regime type of the constitution seems to have no effect on the proportion of common rights included in the constitution. The authoritarian constitution variable only has statistically significant effect on the proportion of common rights in model 7, when no covariates are included in the model, and even in that model, the effect is small. The regime type of the drafter matters far more for rare rights. Dictators include far fewer rare rights in their constitutions than democrats. This effect is consistent across models 10, 11, and 12. The estimates in model 12
A. Executive Power
B. Judicial Independence
C. Constitutional Rights
suggest that the proportion of rare rights is the fewest in authoritarian constitutions that do not experience a regime transition. Such constitutions have (on average) between 5 and 7 fewer rare rights democratic constitutions. But stable authoritarians are never likely to do so. significantly less specific than democratic constitution. They cover fewer topics, and the topics they cover are addressed in less detail. Once again, the effect of authoritarian constitutions is limited to authoritarian constitutions that do not experience a transition to democracy. Notably, the findings related to specificity correspond to our general impression of constitutions written in authoritarian regime: they tend to be relatively short.
D. Specificity
E. Robustness Checks
To summarize our findings thus far, authoritarian constitutions are the same as democratic constitutions in terms of the amount of power allocated to the executive and the number of common rights guaranteed. Authoritarian constitutions diverge from democratic constitutions, though, when analyzing the independence of the judiciary, rare rights, and specificity. Importantly, the results suggest that these differences are limited to authoritarian constitutions that never experience a transition to democracy. The results indicate that authoritarian constitutions that do experience a transition to democracy at some point during their life span are no different in substance than constitutions written by democrats, at least in terms of the 6 constitutional attributes we analyze. Even authoritarian constitutions that do experience a regime transition, though, do not differ too much from democratic constitutions.
Our estimates suggest that such constitutions, on average, contain one less feature that protects the autonomy of the judiciary (out of 6), guarantee 5-7 fewer rare rights (out of between 80 and 110), addresses 2 fewer scope items (out of 58) and contain 5% fewer words on each topic than democratic constitutions.
In addition to the estimates reported in tables 2-5, we have estimated a number of additional models to assess the robustness of our results. 12 We have estimated models with fixed, instead of random, effects and with neither fixed nor random-effects. We have used the there would be less need to specify the explicit powers of the executive, and we would observe lower levels of power relative to democracies. This is consistent with the idea that the source of authoritarian power is, in many cases, informal and extraconstitutional.
The other differences in the results pertain to the analyses focused on constitutions drafted since World War II. Authoritarian constitutions that did not experience a regime transition and that were drafted in the post-World War II period contain 2 or 3 fewer common rights than democratic constitutions drafted during this time period. Authoritarian constitutions that experienced a regime transition during this time period had significantly more rare rights (about 4 or 5) and addressed significantly more topics (2 or 3) than democratic constitutions. In other words, the substantive differences between authoritarian constitutions that experienced a regime transition and those that did not are larger in the post-World War II era than they were prior to World War II. Of course, this could be due to the small number of authoritarian constitutions that experience a regime change from 1800-1946. Given this variation over time, it is unsurprising that we find authoritarian and democratic constitutions have adapted to modern norms differently.
In summary, we consistently observe important differences between authoritarian constitutions that never experience a transition to democracy and both authoritarian constitutions that do experience a democracy transition and democratic constitutions. The former have less autonomous judiciaries, guarantee fewer rights (especially rare rights), and are less specific.
Authoritarian constitutions that survive a regime change, in other words, are closer to democratic constitutions in content than are those authoritarian documents that are not retained. It is unclear whether this is a result of a selection effect, in that authoritarians a la Pinochet are writing more "democratic" documents in preparation for regime transition. Regardless, it does appear that the content of the authoritarian document is related to the new democrats' decision to keep or scrap it.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that there are few systematic differences across the formal constitutions of democracies and dictatorships, but there are some. At the margin, authoritarian constitutions tend to be less specific, protect fewer rights (especially those rights that are less common), and provide for less judicial independence. We do not, however, see higher levels of executive power in authoritarian texts, probably because executive power is residual in authoritarian systems. But none of these differences is very large across the entire set of cases.
Instead, the most important determinants of constitutional form are the era and the region in which the constitution was written, and the set of institutions chosen for the first constitution in the country's history. There is a good deal of serial dependence in constitutional texts.
If we assume that authoritarian institutions and rights protections differ systematically from democratic ones, our aggregate result of overall similarity in formal texts calls into question the For the imputation decision, we decided to impute the UDS. To do so, we used Amelia II (King et al. 2001 ) to impute 10 data sets using the three measures of democracy that span back to 1800 (i.e. Boix and Rosato (2012) , Polity (Marshall et al. 2011) , and VanHanen (2002) 15 constitutions are uncategorized due to missing data on regime type. 8 We combine democratic constitutions that experience a regime transition and those that do not into one category because there are so few that survive a regime transition (only 2 in force in 2008).
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The measure of executive power described in Elkins et al. (2011) aggregates the subcomponents of the measure using weights derived inductively from a regression model. Here, we adopt an unweighted version of that measure, because the sample in this paper is drastically different from that elaborated in Elkins et al. (2011) .
The lagged dependent variable is missing for each countries' first constitution. Rather than omitting all of these observations due to listwise deletion, we substitute our best estimate of the expected level of the dependent variable for countries' first constitutions: the mean level of the dependent variable from all other constitutions in force the year prior to promulgation of the first constitution. To illustrate, Brazil's first constitution was written in 1824, so the lagged value of executive power is missing for Brazil's constitution of 1824. To ensure this constitution is included in the analysis, we replace the missing value for executive power with 0.29, which is the mean level of executive power in all constitutions in force in 1823.
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Typically, one does not include country random-effects and a lagged dependent variable in the same model because the lagged dependent variable is presumed to be correlated with the random-effect in the error term, which can introduce bias into the coefficient estimates. Recent research finds that, although such estimators are not unbiased, they are consistent (Ashley 2010 ).
Thus, we include a random-effects term in our main model because we have a relatively large sample and want to control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries without the inefficiency associated with fixed-effects.
